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IV

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE
The state appeals from the District Court ruling affinning the magistrate's order suppressing
evidence of the results of a blood alcohol test drawn without a warrant.

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The state charged Derek Michael Arrotta with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 9) Mr. Arrotta filed
a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a blood draw. (R., pp. 37-41) At the motion
to suppress the magistrate made findings of fact including: Trooper Baldwin had probable cause
to arrest Mr. Arrotta. (Tr. p. 112, Ls. 1-6) Mr. Arrotta was very clear that he refused the
evidentiary testing including breath and blood test. (Tr. p. 112, Ls. 16-25) Trooper Baldwin told
Mr. Arrotta that he must provide a blood draw regardless of his refusal. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 3-8)
Submitting to the authority of the state does not constitute legitimate consent. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 38) There was no exigency and that was acknowledged by the State. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 9-11) The
state maintains that the state relies on Idaho's implied consent law to support the assertion of
consent. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 17-24) The magistrate held that: "Schneckloth v. Bustamante, which is
not an implied consent case ..... .It's just a totality of the circumstances case ..... to detennine if
consent is legitimate or not. (Tr. p. 115, Ls. 10-23) "I do not believe that consent implied by
statute is sufficient to erase ..... a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure." (Tr. p. 115-116, Ls. 1-1) The court held that a categorical exemption for exigency
and a categorical exception under implied consent requires a case by case analysis to establish an

exigency exception. (Tr. p. 117, Ln. 1-18) The government must obtain a warrant absent an
exception of an exigency. (Tr. p. 117, Ls. 14-18) The court suppressed the results of the blood
draw. (Tr. p. 121)
The state appealed to the district court. (R. pp. 67-69) The District Court held: "Judge Judge
found that Trooper Baldwin had probable cause to stop Arrotta for traffic infraction. He found
there were no exigent circumstances, that there was no express consent, nor were there any
exceptions to the warrant requirement that would support the warrantless search." (R. 110 citing
Tr. p 111:19-112:10,113:7-11)
Judge John R. Stegner in his opinion noted that Judge Judge found that Missouri v. McNeely,
133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), cast doubt on Idaho's implied consent law "sufficient to erase ..... a
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures." (R. 110 citing Tr. p.
116:1-5) Judge John R. Stegner noted that Judge Judge stated he could not make a "logical
distinction .... between a categorical per se exception for exigency in [DUI] cases and a
categorical exception under implied consent." (R. 110-111 citing Tr. p. 117:7-10) Therefore, the
state was required to obtain a warrant for a blood draw in this case, and had not done so, making
the invasive search unreasonable. (R. 111)
Judge Stegner then went on to note that the Implied Consent statute authorizes the imposition
of a $250 civil penalty and driver's license suspension for one year for refusal. I.C. § 18-8002.
The court discussed the holdings in State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 371, 775 P.2d 1210, 1213
(1980). (R. 112) The court also noted that drivers were not allowed to refuse to take a blood test
or withdraw the consent to draw blood. (R. 113) The court found that the effect of Woolery and
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its progeny is to make "any driver in the state of Idaho, whether protesting or not, legally subject
to a blood test without any requirement to obtain a warrant. (R. 114) The court held Woolery was
drawn into question by Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). (R. 114) The court also
found the facts in Arrotta case strikingly similar to those in the McNeely case. (R. 114)
The court then conducted an analysis ofthe McNeely case noting the Supreme Court
discussed the implied consent statutes finding that "in those drunk driving investigations where
police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they
do so" citing McNeely at 1561. (R. 115-116) The court found that McNeely is broader than the
state "suggests: it holds that per se statutory schemes attempting to circumvent the warrant
requirement altogether are prohibited." (R. 116) Judge Stegner also noted: "Regarding the State
of Missouri's attempt at such a scheme, a majority of the Court wrote "Here and in its own
courts, the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing
after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a
nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect." McNeely at
1568. (Sotomayer, J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Ragen, JJ.) (R. 116)
The district court went on to hold that Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
requires that voluntariness of consent must be based upon the totality of the circumstances
finding no "single controlling criterion" exists to establish a per se consent exception but that
there must always be a "careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances." Bustamante at
226. (R. 116-117)
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Judge Stegner found: "To adopt the scheme proposed by the State threatens to make the
Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 nullities in Idaho. Every driver, indeed any person in
physical control of a vehicle, would be potentially subject to the invasion of their bodily integrity
by a hypodermic needle upon a showing of reasonable suspicion ..... precluding any driver from
being secure in his person against a blood draw, notwithstanding, persistent refusals." (R. 117118) The Legislature (or the courts) could just as easily imply irrevocable consent to a
warrantless search of a car, simply as a prerequisite to driving on a public road. Or they could
imply irrevocable consent to religious instruction at schools because parents enrolled their
children in the public school system. The irrevocable implied consent could be used to
circumvent virtually all constitutional protections. (R. 118) Then Judge Stegner upheld the
decision of Judge Judge. (R. 118-119) The state appealed. (R. 121-24)

II. STANDARD ON REVIEW
The appellate court applies a bifurcated standard accepting the factual findings unless clearly
erroneous. The court will freely review the application of the constitutional principle to the facts
found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)
In conducting the review the District Court found that the United States Supreme Court in

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568 (2013) held that per se or categorical exceptions to a
warrant requirement were improper.
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III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. Did the state violate defendant's Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to
be free from an unreasonable search and seizure by withdrawing defendant's
blood over his objection and in the absence of exigent circumstances?
B. Maya defendant arrested for driving under the influence revoke his implied

consent under I.e. 18-8004?

e.

May the state of Idaho, after Missouri v. McNeely, condition the privilege of
driving upon an individual's "Implied Consent" to a warrantless blood draw?
III. ARGUMENT

A. The state violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure by withdrawing the defendant's
blood over his objection and in the absence of exigent circumstances.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches.

State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) Administration of blood
alcohol testing constitutes a seizure ofthe person and a search within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. State v. LeClerq, 149 Idaho 905, 243 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App. 2010), citing

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,767,86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-18
(1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007) A search conducted by law
enforcement officers without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the State shows that it fell
within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v.

Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,219,93 S.Ct. 2041,36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dominguez, 137
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Idaho 681, 683,52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct.App.2002) The state has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of unreasonableness:
[t]o overcome this presumption, the State bears the burden of establishing two
prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within
a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Second, the State
must show that even if the search is permissible under an exception to the
warrant requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all of the other
surrounding circumstances.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, there exists no valid exception to the warrant requirement.
Thus, the warrantless blood draw must be suppressed.
MISSOURI V. MCNEELY

In the recent case of Missouri v. McNeely, a case with facts substantially similar to the case at
bar, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects drivers from state
compelled blood draws upon suspicion ofDUI. In so doing, the Court eradicated four decades of
misinterpretation and misapplication of its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, whereby
courts across the country had held that DUI suspects possessed no constitutionally protected
right to be free from compelled warrantless blood draws.
McNeely had been stopped and arrested for DUI. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552,
1554, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Prior to his arrest, Missouri's implied consent statute had been
amended to remove a motorists' statutorily granted right to refuse a blood test, instead
authorizing law enforcement to obtain a warrantless blood draw after a motorist's refusal to
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submit to a test. l Idaho's implied consent statute likewise purports to authorize law enforcement
to extract blood after, or in spite of, a motorist's refusal to submit to test. See, I.C. 18 § 8002-

8004; see also, State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). After his arrest,
McNeely was asked to provide a breath sample. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1554 McNeely refused.

Id. Due to the officer's training concerning the nature of Missouri's implied consent law, he
thereafter transported McNeely the hospital for a warrantless blood draw. /d.
McNeely argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the state from subjecting him to
a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw. The State of Missouri and its Amici argued to the
contrary, asking the Court to put their stamp of approval upon a decades old interpretation of the
its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, i.e. that the evanescent nature of alcohol, in and of
itself, constituted exigent circumstances and therefore a per se exception to the warrant
requirement:
[t]he State contends that whenever an officer has probable cause to believe an
individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol, exigent
circumstances will necessarily exist because BAC evidence is inherently
evanescent. As a result, the State claims that so long as the officer has
probable cause and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner, it is
categorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample
without a warrant.
In a footnote the Missouri Supreme Court explained the history of Missouri's implied consent law:
... the former version of section 577.041.1 stated that if a person refused both the breath-analyzer and the
blood draw test, then "none shall be given." Section 577.041.1, RSMo Supp.2008. However, that section was
amended prior to Defendant's arrest by the deletion of the phrase "and none shall be given." Section
577.041.1, RSMo. Supp.20 I O. With the removal of that phrase, the prosecutor asserted that police officers
now may "rely on the well settled principle that obtaining blood from an arrestee on probable cause without a
warrant and without actual consent does not offend constitutional guarantees." The prosecutor's assertion rests
on a fundamental misreading of Schmerber. n

State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. 2012), reh'g denied (Mar. 6,2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 98, 183 L. Ed. 2d 737
(U.S. 2012) and affd, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (U.S. 2013).
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Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) So the argument went,

with exigency inherent in each and every DUI case, a driver who declines to submit to testing
would be subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. Such an
argument was rejected by the Court:
[h]ere and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that a
driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under
the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test
without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1568, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) The Court held that

exigent circumstances do not exist in each and every DUI case, but rather they must be proven
by the state and determined on a case by case basis:
.. .it does not follow that we should depart from careful case-by-case
assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical rule proposed by the State
and its amici . ... We do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining
a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the bloodstream
will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted warrantless blood
test. That, however, is a reason to decide each case on its facts, as we did in
Schmerber, not to accept the "considerable overgeneralization" that a per se
rule would reflect.
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)(intemal citations

omitted). Ultimately, the Court ruled that:
[i]n those drunk driving investigations where police officers can reasonably
obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly
undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that
they do so.
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Jd. With this ruling, absent a showing of actual exigent circumstances, motorists now possess a

recognized 4th Amendment protection against warrantless blood draws.
Moving to the question of exigency, the McNeely Court referred to the "special facts"
confronting the officer in Schmerber v. California where the Court had previously found exigent
circumstances to exist. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696
(2013)(citingSchmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S. Ct. 1826,1836,16 L. Ed. 2d 908
(1966» In Schmerber we had a single officer, in the 1960s, investigating an accident while also
charged with transporting an injured suspect to the hospital. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct.
1552, 1557, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Further, the Court noted that at the time, there did not
exist the technological advances now present, nor even the procedure in place, to procure
warrants telephonically. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1562, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013)
Given those "special facts" and under the circumstances as they existed in that day and age,
"there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Schmerber, 384 at 771 That
simply was not the case here. Exigent circumstances did not exist in this case and thus the
arresting officer should have attempted to procure a warrant.
A search conducted by law enforcement officers without a warrant is per se unreasonable
unless the State proves it fell within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,219,93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683,52 P.3d 325, 327 (Ct.App.2002) A search
conducted with consent that was voluntarily given is one such exception. Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 219,93 S.Ct. 2041; Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683,52 P.3d at 327 The State has the burden of
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proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result
of duress or coercion, direct or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 221, 93 S.Ct. 2041; State v.
Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796,69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State

v.

Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 554,

989 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.1999); Dominguez, 137 Idaho at 683,52 P.3d at 327 A voluntary
decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. See also, Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,

602,81 S.Ct. 1860,6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)
In the instance case the facts demonstrate that the police conducted a warrantless blood
draw after Mr. Arrotta refused the blood draw. (Tr. p. 112, Ls. 1-6) The officer pursuant to
department policy took a blood draw over the defendant's objection. (Tr. p. 113, Ls. 3-8)
Mr. Derek Arrotta was forced to allow the police to draw blood without a search warrant.
Suppression of the warrantless blood draw is the proper remedy and the defense seeks to have
the appellate court affirm the lower court's decision.
B. A defendant arrested for driving under the influence may revoke his implied
consent under I.e. 18-8004.

To establish consent the state has the burden of demonstrating consent by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 947 P.2d 420,422 (Ct. App.
1997) The state must show the consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or
implied. Sckneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058, 36 L.Ed 854, 875
(1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800,803 (Ct. App. 1993) The

voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Whiteley,
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124 Idaho at 264,858 P.2d at 803 Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of
coercion, is a question of fact to be detennined by all surrounding circumstances. State v.
Hansen, l38 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003)

The evidence demonstrates the refusal of both the breath and blood test. The evidence
here demonstrates coercion by both direct and implied threats. The argument of consent must fail
under the facts of this case. The state has not demonstrated an exigency to justify the warrantless
blood draw and Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S.

, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (20l3) requires suppression

of the blood draw. The State ofIdaho does not recognize a good faith exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,272 P.3d 483 (2012)
Article I § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution grants greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Article I § 17 provides: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizure shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that this provision provides Idaho citizens greater protection
from illegal searches.
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that Article I § 17 provides greater protection from
the use of illegally seized evidence. State v. Arrequi, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927); State v.

Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 P.2d 671 (1978) The court similarly held that Article I § 17 granted greater
protection to Idaho citizens and held the Leon good faith exception was contrary to Article I §

17. State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 516-518, 272 P.3d 483 (2012)

11

Article I § 17 provides the same type of protection when government seeks to force a
criminal defendant to provide a blood sample. Article I § 17 assures that the person is protected
absent warrants "particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized". Article I § 17 does not allow for searches absent particular facts related to any particular
person, a per se search, therefore violates Article I § 17. In applying Article I § 17 the Idaho
Supreme Court should not allow a per se exception to the warrant requirement in a DUI case. It
is important to note that the court in State

v.

Diaz did not consider whether Article I § 17 grants

greater protection because the argument was not made before the District Court. State

v.

Diaz,

144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007) In light of the courts holding in State v. Koivu,
152 Idaho 511, 519,272 P.2d 483, 491 (2012) holding there is greater protection under Article I

§ 17 by not extending Leon good faith exception under Article I § 17. This court should protect
Idaho citizens from warrantless searches after they refuse the test and revoke consent where there
are not particular facts justifying the searches as required by Article I § 17. Absent a search
warrant Article I § 17 requires suppression of the blood draw.
C. The State of Idaho, after Missouri v. McNeely, may not condition the privilege of

driving upon an individual's "Implied Consent" to a warrantless blood draw.
Judge John R. Stegner in his opinion articulated that: "Neither the legislature nor the
courts of Idaho have the authority to suspend the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17 by
imposing irrevocable implied consent in criminal cases. To acknowledge such power would
essentially render our constitution meaningless. The legislature (or the courts) could just as easily
imply irrevocable consent to a warrantless search of a car, simply as a prerequisite to drive on a
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public road. Or they could imply irrevocable consent to religious instruction at schools because
parents enrolled their children in the public educational system. The irrevocable implied consent
mechanism could be used to circumvent virtually all constitutional protection." (R. 117-118)
Here the court was articulating the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning the
grant of a privilege upon the waiver of a constitutional right. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Frost v. R.R. Comm In o.f State o.f Cal.:
[i]t would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation
which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same
result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for
a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not
necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having
power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it
sees fit to impose. But the power o.f the state in that respect is not unlimited,
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require
the relinquishment o.f constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender o.f one constitutional right as a condition o.f its favor, it may, in like
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated
out of existence.
Frost

v.

R.R. Comm'n ofState of Cal. , 271 U.S. 583, 593-94,46 S. Ct. 605,607, 70 L. Ed. 1101

(1926)( emphasis ours) The doctrine has been applied in a number of jurisdictions, including
Arizona and Georgia, to the granting of the privilege to drive. Those courts dealing with the
issue have all held that the doctrine prevents the conditioning of the privilege to drive upon the
waiver of one's Fourth amendment rights. As it is now clear, following McNeely, that motorists
have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, absent a true showing
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of exigent circumstances, the state is not free to condition the granting of the privilege to drive
upon a citizen's waiver of that right. In other words, consent may not be "implied" with respect
to warrantless blood draws.
Idaho's implied consent law purports to condition the privilege to drive upon one giving
their implied consent to a warrantless blood draw upon law enforcement's suspicion ofDUI.
Idaho's Implied consent Statute, I.C. § 18-8002 provides in part:
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have
given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request
of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code.

I.e. § 18-8002(1) Defendant recognizes that several Idaho courts, prior to McNeely, have held
that a driver was deemed to have given his "implied" consent to a warrantless blood draw merely
by driving upon the roadways ofthe statc:
[u]nder Idaho's implied consent statute, I.e. § 18-8002( 1), anyone driving on
Idaho roads is deemed to have impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for
the presence of alcohol or drugs when a police officer has reasonable cause to
believe the person was driving under the influence. In other words, "[b]y
virtue of this statute, 'anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a motor
vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a BAC
test.' " Rodriguez, 128 Idaho at 523, 915 P.2d at 1381 (quoting Matter of
McNeely, 119 Idaho 182,187,804 P.2d 911, 916 (Ct.App.1990». See also
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P .3d 739. Implied consent to evidentiary testing is
not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's
blood or urinc. I.C. § 18-8002(9)
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State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712-13,184 P.3d 215, 218-19 (Ct. App. 2008). However, the

Defendant would argue that such a conditional grant of the privilege to drive was not considered
to afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that under pre-McNeely
jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional right to be free from
warrantless blood draws. See, State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296, 306, 328 P.2d 1065, 1071 (1958); see
also, State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 489, 680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984) As the McNeely
decision has changed the constitutional landscape in this regard, and it is settled that motorists do
in fact have a protected Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless blood draws, the
State is prohibited from conditioning the granting of the privilege to drive upon a waiver of that
right.
Due to the recency of the McNeely decision, no court holding precedential authority has
ruled on the constitutionality of states implied consent statutes with respect to compelled blood
draws. However, as stated infra, a number of courts have dealt with the issue of statutorily
implying consent to warrantless blood draws where the Fourth Amendment would otherwise
prohibit such a search, e.g. where probable cause was lacking to suspect the motorist ofDUI. In
each such case those Courts held that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibited the
legislature from conditioning the grant of the privilege to drive upon the waiver of the
protections ofthe Fourth Amendment. In other words, those courts held that the legislature
could not circumvent the Fourth Amendment by "implying" consent to an otherwise unlawful
search. State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72-73, 178 P.3d 1190, 1196-97 (Ct. App. 2008), Cooper v.
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State, 277 Ga. 282, 289-91,587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003), Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977,
986-87 on reh 'gJ- 793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

In State v. QUinnJ- the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality of a section
of the Arizona implied consent law which purported to "imply" a motorists' consent to
warrantless blood draws absent probable cause to believe the motorist to have been DUI.
Specifically, the statute at issue sought to imply consent in every instance where a motorist was
involved in an accident which resulted in death or serious injury to another. State v. Quinn, 218
Ariz. 66, 69, 178 P .3d 1190, 1193 (Ct. App. 2008) The defendant, Quinn, was involved in such
an accident. It was undisputed that law enforcement did not possess probable cause to believe
Quinn to be DUI. Nevertheless, acting under authority of Arizona's implied consent statute, law
enforcement extracted blood without a warrant and absent actual consent. The State of Arizona
argued that consent was implied by the operation of statute:
[t]he State further asserts that, even assuming the statute does not fit within the
special needs exception, Quinn consented to the search because § 28-673
specifies that all those who drive a vehicle on Arizona roads consent to such a
search. In support it relies on Tornabene v. Bonine ex rei. Ariz. Highway
Deptt, 203 Ariz. 326, 334, ~ 19, 54 P.3d 355, 363 (App.2002), which held,
"driving in Arizona is not a right, but a privilege, subject to legislative
mandate."
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 72, 178 P .3d 1190, 1196 (Ct. App. 2008) In rejecting the state's

argument, the Court noted that the Fourth Amendment required probable cause for DUI prior to
the extraction of blood:
[n]ormally, because any forced extraction of blood by the State invades one's
expectation of privacy in bodily integrity, the intrusion is subject to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 203 Ariz. 1, 9, ~ 27,
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49 P.3d 273, 281 (2002); see also Schmerber v. Cahfornia. 384 U.S. 757,
767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). As Schmerber explains, the
State's unconsented-to search of a person's blood requires probable cause to
believe that the search will reveal the presence of controlled or intoxicating
substances. 384 U.S. at 768-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Schmerber Court stated
that:
[t]he interests in human di!,rnity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protects forbid any [ ] intrusions [into a person's blood] on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental
human interests require law officers to suffer the risk that such evidence
may disappear. ...
Id. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. 1826.

State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 68-69, 178 P .3d 1190, 1192-93 (Ct. App. 2008) Applying the

unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the statute, the Court ruled the statute an unconstitutional
exercise oflegislative authority:
... states may not condition the grant of a privilege on the forfeiture of a
constitutional right..."a statute cannot circumvent a firmly established
constitutional right."
As Schmerber makes clear, Quinn's constitutional right is to be free of any
searches of her blood "[i] n the absence of a clear indication" that her blood
would demonstrate the presence of alcohol or other controlled substances.
Thus, within the limits ofthe Constitution, the State cannot condition Quinn's
driving privilege on the surrender of her constitutional right not to have
evidence admitted against her in a criminal prosecution that was taken from
her without a consent and in the absence of probable cause.
State v. Quinn, 218 Ariz. 66, 73, 178 P .3d 1190, 1197 (Ct. App. 2008).

In Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 587 S.E.2d 605 (2003), the Georgia Supreme Court dealt
with a statute nearly identical to that in Quinn:
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[u]nder OCGA § 40-5-55(a), because Cooper was involved in an accident
resulting in "serious injuries," as defined in subsection (c) of the statute, he
was deemed by operation oflaw to have given consent to the administered
blood test to determine if there was the presence of alcohol or any other drug.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,285,587 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2003)(citations omitted). The Georgia
Court noted:
[t]he high courts of several other states have grappled with the constitutionality
of provisions allowing the chemical testing of bodily substances without
probable cause or valid consent, and based solely on a serious traffic mishap.
These courts have uniformly rejected provisions which obviate the finding of
probable cause. See McDuffv. State, 763 So.2d 850 (Miss.2000); Blank v.
State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska 2000); King v. Ryan, 153 Ill.2d 449, 180 IlI.Dec.
260, 607 N.E.2d 154 (1992); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d
308 (Pa.1992). Compare State v. Roche, 681 A.2d 472 (Maine 1996).
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 287-88, 587 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (2003). The Court then held, as
did the Court in Quinn that an implied consent statute could not act to imply consent where to do
so would require the waiver of a motorist's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure:

[t]his Court's use of the term "suspect" in regard to the Implied Consent
Statute brings into sharp focus the flaw in that portion of the statute compelling
chemical testing of the person merely by virtue of involvement in a traffic
accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. There is no requirement of
individualized suspicion, much less probable cause, that would render the
person "suspect" of impaired driving.
Thus, to the extent that OCGA § 40-5-55(a) requires chemical testing of the
operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious
injuries or fatalities regardless of any determination of probable cause, it
authorizes unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the State and
Federal Constitutions.
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Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282,290,587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003) In so holding the Court cited

the following language from the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977,
987 (Ind.App.2003):
[t]he legislature cannot, however, abrogate a person's Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined by the
Supreme Court. To hold that the legislature could nonetheless pass laws
stating that a person "impliedly" consents to searches under certain
circumstances where a search would otherwise be unlart;ful would be to
condone an unconstitutional bypassing of the Fourth Amendment.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 290, 587 S.E.2d 605, 611-12 (2003) The Court concluded by

stating:
"The requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating." Hannoy v.
State, supra at 988. The illegally-obtained test results were not admissible
against Cooper at trial, and the trial court erred in denying Cooper's motion to
suppress such evidence.
Cooper v. State, 277 Ga. 282, 291, 587 S.E.2d 605, 613 (2003)

In Hannoy v. State, 789 N .E.2d 977, on reh g.1 793 N .E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), the
Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the Marion County Sheriff
Department's policy of obtaining blood samples without probable cause from drivers involved in
accidents resulting in serious bodily injury or death. !d. Hannay was involved in an accident
involving the death of another individual and, as in Quinn and Cooper, law enforcement lacked
probable cause to believe Hannoy to be DUI. Rejecting a "special needs" argument as well as an
argument that Indiana's implied consent statute authorized the blood draw, the Court found the
warrantless blood draw unconstitutional:
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[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment cannot be lowered based upon
the heinousness of the particular crime police are investigating. We are well
aware of the pain and suffering inflicted by intoxicated drivers on our roads.
Nevertheless, we do not perceive that our opinion today, which will apparently
require alterations in the standard policy of at least one major Indiana law
enforcement agency, wiIl unduly burden law enforcement officers in collecting
blood alcohol readings in cases such as this ... To the extent our holding today
may lead to the loss of blood alcohol or illicit drug content evidence in some
cases, we heed the words of the Supreme Court in Schmerber that the Fourth
Amendment imposes limitations on the ability of police to investigate criminal
activity and sometimes requires police to "suffer the risk" that certain evidence
thereby will not be obtained. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835.
The withdrawal of Hannoy's blood was not obtained pursuant to the
guidelines in the implied consent statutes and cannot be justified as being
drawn in accordance with those statutes. The withdrawal was not
accomplished in accordance with the Fourth Amendment and Schmerber
because there was no probable cause to believe Hannoy was intoxicated at the
time his blood was drawn and no actual, knowing, and voluntary consent to
the withdrawal. The "special needs" exception to the probable cause
requirement cannot be applied in the context of a criminal investigation by
law enforcement. Therefore, the blood alcohol content evidence obtained
from the blood draw performed at the request oflaw enforcement was
illegally obtained and should not have been admitted into evidence by the trial
court.

Hannay, at 987-89 on

reh'g~

793 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

The McNeely Court gave the clear mandate that "[i]n those drunk driving investigations
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn
without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates
that they do so." Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552,1561,185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) Thus,
after McNeely, a motorist arrested on suspicion of DUI now clearly has a constitutional right to
be free from warrantless intrusions into their body absent the existence of either a true showing
of exigent circumstances cause or actual valid consent. As such, the unconstitutional conditions
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doctrine now prohibits the legislature from bypassing constitutional protections ofthe Fourth
Amendment and implying, or otherwise requiring, consent upon the act of accepting the
privilege to drive. Thus, the Diaz decision cited by the State is inapplicable to this instant case.
Consent cannot be implied when we are dealing with the prospect of "consenting away" a valid
Fourth Amendment right. As Judge John R. Stegner articulated: "The irrevocable implied
consent mechanism could be used to circumvent virtually all constitutional protections:' The
unconstitutional conditions doctrine mandates the courts upholding of the District Court's
decision suppressing the warrantless blood draw.
I.

CONCLUSION

The defendant in a driving under the influence case should not be held to have consented
to a warrantless blood draw after refusing the breath test and blood draw. The Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution require a
warrant before conducting forced blood draws. The defense respectfully seeks to have the
District Court's decision upheld.
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